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Abstract : 
 
Long run returns of IPO firms’ recommendations in Europe reveal possible conflicts of 
interest and pressures faced by financial analysts over the 1991-2005 period. Nevertheless, 
recent European legislations about investment research have led to better long run 
performance of IPO firms’ recommendations issued by affiliated analysts over the 2001-2005 
period. Findings reveal that market participants do not fully incorporate the perceived value of 
recommendations. Indeed, difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ 
recommendations is statistically significant over one, three or five year horizon. The timing of 
recommendations specifies that investors pay more attention to affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations made later in the aftermarket. This result could suggest that the later is the 
recommendation made in the IPO aftermarket the weaker is the pressure faced by affiliated 
analysts. 
 
Keywords: Initial Public Offering, conflicts of interest, financial analysts, long run 
performance. 
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Introduction : 
 
The findings of academic research evoke the difficult objectivity of the financial analysts 
whose employer is a managing underwriter at the IPO. They overestimate the earnings or 
issue more positive recommendations. These studies have revealed that analysts were biased 
towards providing favourable reports and have suggested that the analysts are incited to the 
optimism in the commercial interest of their employer, to the detriment of their objectivity 
and reputation. 
In 2002, Citigroup is confronted to 125 lawsuits, for the majority, against a renamed analyst. 
This analyst covered Worldcom, Lucent, Global Crossing, Winstar, AT*T, and QWest, all 
have filed for bankruptcy. In February, 2001, while the price of Winstar drops near to 1 
dollar, the analyst continues to give positive recommendation with a target price near to 50 
dollars. The company has generated 24 million dollars in trading commissions. Between 1996 
and 2002, Citigroup helped 81 companies of telecoms to raise 190 billion dollars. During 4 
years, Worldcom has produced more than 100 million dollars of contracts for Citigroup. 
But the scandals are not limited to the United States. They also rise in European markets. 
For example, in Germany, the controversy rose about the analysts who recommended the 
young technological values of Neuer Markt, about 50 companies which have filed for 
bankruptcy without having aroused many suspicions. In 2001, the authority of the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange opened an investigation on a suspect deal: the sale of 44 million shares 
Deutsche Telekom by Deutsche Bank for the benefit of an Asian investor. A transaction 
makes in a lower price than that of the market and which causes a decrease of more than 20 % 
compared to its market price while, simultaneously, the bank gave buy recommendations. 
In France, Crédit Lyonnais was convicted in 2002 to indemnify a customer ruined by its bad 
advices. The LVMH company did not hesitate to summons a British analyst to appear before 
the court to the motive that she would have favoured the Gucci company, the customer of her 
employer, to the detriment of LVMH in its financial analyses. Further, the shareholders of the 
Kalisto company blamed Crédit Lyonnais for having communicated, via its financial analyses, 
false information to the market. The bank was, at the same time, an underwriter, market-
maker, creditor and shareholder of Kalisto. Finally, in 2003, the price of the Suez company 
lost more than 4 %, following rumours that the group would have asked to certain analysts to 
revise their earnings forecasts. 
However, in Europe, the independence of the analysts is less opened to doubt than in the 
United States, due to the institutional rules. Some practices, developed in the United States 
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and being able to compromise the objectivity of the analysts, are forbidden in Europe, 
especially the indexation of the analysts’ compensation on the amount of IPOs. 
 
This paper deals with the influence of investment banking ties between analysts’ employers 
and the IPO firms that analysts cover on long run returns. Investment banks are mandated by 
the newly public firm in order to review the company and write reports about her. They gather 
the intention of investors to participate in the offering, and finally follow the newly issued 
security in the aftermarket. The investment banker analyst produces reports that include the 
collection and evaluation of information related to a firm’s future performance. From this 
information, the analyst produces earnings forecasts, target prices and stock 
recommendations. The analysts of underwriters draw attention because their roles expose 
them to possible pressure by their employers. This paper addresses the question of the nature 
of its influence on the long run returns of European IPO firms over the 1991-2005 period. 
 
Prior results find no systematic evidence of the influence of investment banking ties on 
returns of IPOs. Michaely and Womack (1999) find that the returns earned following 
investment banker analysts (hereafter affiliated analysts) for IPOs are significantly lower than 
those earned following non investment banker analysts (hereafter unaffiliated analysts). 
Dechow et al. (2000) find more pronounced underperformance of IPOs and SEOs with the 
highest growth forecasts made by affiliated analysts. Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and 
McNichols (1998) find no difference in the returns following affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts. It is worth noting that these studies are applied on American markets. 
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first study which investigates the influence of 
investment banking ties on the long run returns of IPOs in the European markets over the 
1991-2005 period. This constitutes an out-of-sample test. Our observation period is large and 
overlaps the 2000s period characterized by significant regulatory changes in the financial 
analysts’ investment research. We analyse long run performance from one year to five year 
following the IPO. We measure the influence of investment banking ties on the long run 
performance of IPOs during a five-year horizon. Then, we are able to observe the adjustment 
of long run performance for affiliated versus unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations. We 
define lead manager plus co manager analyst as affiliated. We present our findings by 
dividing our sample period by three sub-periods in order to show that results vary 
substantially through time. 
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Conversely to prior studies, we focus on recommendations made within the three years after 
the IPO (most of prior studies focus only on the recommendations released the first year after 
the issuance). We are interested in the timing of the recommendations because we think, like 
Adams (2003), that investor reaction is stronger to analyst recommendation made later in the 
IPO aftermarket, because later coverage is more likely to have new information and is not 
anticipated by investor. 
 
We find that recent European regulatory changes are very important for the analysts’ 
investment research. Whereas affiliated analysts seem to suffer of pressure and a lack of 
independence over the 1991-2000 period, the opposite tendency appears over the 2001-2005 
period, giving more consideration for these analysts. Long run returns reveal that investors do 
not recognize the full extent of this pressure, because we find a significantly negative mean 
difference between post-recommendation returns to the affiliated analysts’ recommendations 
and those of unaffiliated analysts over the three and five-year horizon. The timing of 
recommendations suggests that investors give more weight to analyst coverage released later 
in the aftermarket. Over the 2001-2005 period, the dependence of affiliated analysts becomes 
very important and investors discount affiliated analysts’ recommendations made within the 
first year following the IPOs compared to unaffiliated ones (statistically significant over the 
three-year horizon) whereas recommendations made later in the aftermarket reveal the 
superior information held by affiliated analysts. 
 
The paper is organised as follow: we first analyze the existing literature in order to define our 
hypothesis. In a second section, we describe methodology, data and sample statistics. The 
third section presents findings. The last section concludes. 
 
1 – Prior literature and hypothesis development: 
 
1.1- Relationship between financial analysts and the investment banking services. 
 
Most studies focus on potential influence which occurs when a firm’s investment banking 
department provides services to a client, and its financial analyst issue research reports on the 
same client. 
Dugar and Nathan (1995) find that market participants rely relatively less on the affiliated 
analysts’ recommendations and their earning forecasts in forming their earnings expectations. 
However, the returns earned by following the investment recommendations of affiliated 
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analysts are not significantly different from returns earned by following the unaffiliated 
analysts’ recommendations. 
Michaely and Womack (1999) find, using a sample of 391 IPOs in the USA over the period 
1990 and 1991, that affiliated analysts’ recommendations perform more poorly than 
recommendations by unaffiliated analysts (consistent with Iskoz, 2003, Houston et al., 2006). 
Affiliated analysts issue recommendations that are overly optimistic (positively biased) and 
these analysts may be compelled to issue more positive recommendations on firms that have 
traded poorly in IPO aftermarket (consistent with James and Karceski, 2006). According to 
Chen (2004), even though the market reaction to favourable recommendations is less positive 
for affiliated analysts, long run return analyses suggest that analysts’ affiliation is not 
significantly associated with long run abnormal returns after recommendations. 
O’Brien et al. (2005) examine whether investment banking ties influence the speed with 
which analysts convey unfavourable news. Their findings indicate that banking ties increase 
analysts’ reluctance to reveal negative news and cause them to accelerate good news. 
Moreover, the authors find that affiliated analysts are less likely than unaffiliated analysts to 
drop coverage. 
Agrawal and Chen (2008) find that the level of analysts’ stock recommendations is positively 
related to the magnitude of pressure they face. The authors specify that investors recognize 
analyst pressures and properly discount analyst opinions. 
 
Since the burst of the internet bubble in 2000 and the bankruptcies which followed, value and 
integrity in investment research were the subject of a greater regulatory control. Recent 
studies are interested in the impact of these regulations. Clarke et al. (2009) examine, over the 
2000-2007 period, the impact of NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472 and the Global 
Settlement on the recommendation performance of financial analysts. They find that analysts 
issue fewer strong buys and are less likely to issue innovative recommendations. Downgrades 
recommendations become more prevalent following these regulations, but they are 
significantly less informative. Finally, Independent analysts’ recommendations are of inferior 
quality. Kadan et al. (2009) specify that, after these regulations, analysts are still reluctant to 
issue pessimistic recommendations for IPO firms and affiliated analysts are even more 
reluctant to be pessimistic about these stocks. 
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1.2 European legislation framework relating to conflicts of interest in investment research. 
 
The stock market crisis which began in the United States in the fall of 2000, highlighted the 
dysfunctions in the management of financial companies among the largest market 
capitalizations, and by extension in the mode of elaboration of recommendations made by 
financial analysts. It has achieved the scale and difficulty of the question of conflicts of 
interest and their good management inside investment banks. Regulators put financial analysts 
under tight surveillance and have launched several reforms. Both requirements and guidelines 
have been developed in the United States and Europe to eliminate, manage or disclose analyst 
conflicts of interest. In Europe, the IOSCO settlement (2003) lays down some principles and 
measures to prevent and manage conflicts of interest. 
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Principles Core Measures 
  
Analysts’ trading activities or financial interests do 
not prejudice their research and recommendations. 
Prohibiting analysts from trading securities or related 
derivatives ahead of publishing research on the issuer of 
those securities; Prohibiting analysts from covering an 
issuer, where the analyst serves as an officer, director or 
member of the issuer’s supervisory board. 
  
Analysts’ research and recommendations should be 
not prejudiced by the trading activities or financial 
interests of the firms that employ them. 
Prohibiting firms that employ analysts from improperly 
trading securities or related derivatives ahead of the 
analyst publishing research on the issuer of those 
securities.Prohibiting analysts from covering an issuer in 
which members of the analyst’s firm serve as officers, 
directors or members of the supervisory board  
 
Analysts’ research and recommendations should be 
not prejudiced by the business relationships 
(investment banking or other services to the issuers) 
of the firms that employ them. 
Establishing robust information barriers between analysts 
and a firm’s other divisions in order to limit the potential 
for conflicts of interest, prohibiting analysts from 
participating in investment banking sales pitches and 
road shows 
  
If the analyst’s likelihood for promotion or financial 
bonus depends on his or her ability to promote the 
firm’s investment banking business or promote 
shares that the analyst’s employer has underwritten, 
then objectivity may be compromised. 
 
Prohibiting analysts from reporting to the investment 
banking function; prohibiting analyst compensation from 
being directly linked to specific investment banking 
transactions 
  
Issuers and shareholders often have a deep interest 
in the reviews provided by securities analysts 
because these reviews encourage or dissuade 
investors from purchasing or selling shares of a 
company. These outside parties may try to pressure 
an analyst into making a favourable 
recommendation. 
Requiring that analysts, or the firms that employ analysts, 
publicly disclose whether the issuer or other third party 
provided any compensation or other benefit in connection 
with a research report 
  
Disclosure of conflicts of interest should be 
complete, timely, clear and made in a prominent 
manner so that investors obtain the full benefit of 
the information provided. 
 
  
Analysts should be both competent and honest. Imposing general legal obligations designed to hold 
analysts to high standards of integrity  
  
Investor education should play an important role in 
managing analyst conflicts of interest. 
Investor education can focus on making investors aware 
of the disclosure rules in their own jurisdiction so that 
they can better conduct their research and evaluate 
potential biases and conflicts of interest. 
  
 
Two Directives complete the IOSCO report. The first one is the Directive on insider dealing 
and market manipulation (market abuse) of 2003 which is intended to guarantee the integrity 
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of European financial markets and increase investor confidence. The second is the Directive 
on markets in financial instruments of 2004. These directives prevent issuers to influence the 
research produced by investment firms. They also prevent the analysts to disclose information 
likely to influence prices prior to disclosure to the rest of the market participants. 
 
1.3 Hypotheses development 
 
Financial analysts may be face conflicts of interest which fear that their recommendations 
become worthless to investors. 
As in Bradley et al. (2008), we focus on the market’s performance to a recommendation made 
by an affiliated analyst or not. 
Affiliated recommendations may be associated with a more positive announcement effect than 
unaffiliated recommendations if the market views these analysts as having sufficiently 
superior information or expertise to more than offset any conflict of interest. 
H1: Market performance to affiliated recommendations may be associated with a more 
positive announcement effect than unaffiliated recommendations (Superior information 
hypothesis). 
Affiliated recommendations may be associated with a less positive announcement effect than 
unaffiliated recommendations if the market views these analysts as having a greater conflict 
of interest that is not offset by superior information. 
H2: Market performance to affiliated recommendations may be associated with a less positive 
announcement effect than unaffiliated recommendations (Sceptical markets hypothesis). 
Lastly, there may be no difference in announcement effects because the market is naive about 
the differential conflicts of interest. 
H3: Market performance may be no difference in announcement effects between affiliated and 
unaffiliated recommendations (Naive markets hypothesis). 
Two explanations may be advanced: 1) there may be no difference in announcement effects 
because, on balance, the more severe conflicts that affiliated analysts face are offset by their 
superior information and 2) there may be no difference in announcement effects because the 
incentives for unaffiliated analysts to curry favour are so strong that they face conflicts of 
interest just as severe as affiliated analysts. 
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2 - Methodologies, data and sample statistics: 
 
2.1 - Methodologies: 
 
The results of long term performance studies are very sensitive to methodological choices. 
We therefore present our results using two frequently used and recommended methodologies 
(Brav and Gompers (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997)). 
Firstly, we use the calendar-time approach as in Fama and French (1996). Their three-factor 
model says that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate [(ERi) – Rf ] is 
explained by the sensitivity of its return to three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad 
market portfolio (RM – Rf); (ii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks 
and the return on a portfolio of big stocks (SMB, small minus big); and (iii) the difference 
between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio 
of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). Specifically, the expected excess 
return on portfolio i is, 
 
ܧሺܴ௜ሻ െ ௙ܴ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ሾEሺRMሻ െ R୤ሿ ൅ ݏ௜EሺSMBሻ ൅ ݄௜EሺHMLሻ ൅ ߝ௜, 
 
where E(Ri) is the monthly return on the IPO portfolio, Rf is the one-month Treasury bill rate, 
E (RM) is the monthly return on a equally-weight market portfolio of stocks listed on their 
respective European market, E(SMB) is the difference between the returns on portfolios of 
small and big stocks (below or above the median), and E(HML) is the difference between the 
returns on portfolios of high- and low-book to market stocks (above and below the 0.7 and 0.3 
fractiles of book-to-market ratios). 
Secondly, we perform an event-time approach as in Brav and Gompers (1997). Fama and 
French (1992, 1993) have shown that size and book-to-market are important determinants of 
the cross section of stock returns. We compare performance of IPOs to size and book-to-
market portfolios. Starting in January 1991, we use all stocks listed on their respective market 
to create size quartile breakpoints with an equal number of firms in each size quartile. For 
example, we use Euronext stocks for France, General Standard, Prime Standard and Entry 
Standard stocks for Germany, Main Market and AIM stocks for England. Size is measured as 
the number of shares outstanding times the stock price at the end of the preceding month. 
Monthly book-to-market data are extracted from Datastream database for each firm. Within 
each size quartile we form four book-to-market portfolios with an equal number of firms in 
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each book-to-market quartile to form 16 size and book-to-market portfolios. Equally weighted 
returns are calculated for each portfolio. In order to avoid comparing IPO firms to themselves, 
we eliminate IPO firms from the various portfolios for five years after their equity issue. Each 
issue is matched to its corresponding benchmark portfolio. 
Long term performance is calculated using Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR). 
The return on a buy-and-hold investment in the sample firm minus the return on a buy-and-
hold investment in a portfolio with an appropriate expected return (BHAR) is 
ܤܪܣܴ௜௧ ൌ ෑሾ1 ൅ ܴ௜௧ሿ െ  ෑሾ1 ൅ ܧሺܴ௜௧ሻሿ
ఛ
௧ୀଵ
ఛ
௧ୀଵ
 
where Rit is defined as the month t simple return on a sample firm, E(Rit) as the month t 
expected return for the sample firm, i.e. the return of firm i’s benchmark over the same 
period. 
 
Long term buy and hold abnormal returns are positively skewed and this positive skewness 
leads to negatively biased t-statistics. Lyon et al. (1999) recommend, in order to eliminate the 
skewness bias, the use of a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic. 
 
2.2 Data and Sample statistics 
 
Data come from different sources. We first identify firms that went public during 1991-2005 
from the Thomson Financial Securities Data Company (SDC) Common Stock initial Public 
Offerings database. Consistent with prior studies, we eliminate IPOs that are classified as 
ADRs, REITs, closed-end funds, along with offerings having a file range midpoint of less 
than €8. Our sample contains 525 IPO firms whose 132 IPOs went public in England, 205 
IPOs went public in Germany and 188 IPOs went public in France. 
Analyst data are collected from the analyst-by-analyst I/B/E/S historical earnings estimate 
database. I/B/E/S provides us 9,705 recommendations made during the three years following 
IPO between 1991 and 2005. 
Long run performance is calculated using the Datastream monthly stock price database. 
Table 1 presents a description of the investment recommendations. In panel A, the frequency 
distributions show that 86 (47,5%) of the affiliated analysts’ recommendations are either 
strong buy or buy whereas 1356 (51,7%) of the unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations fall 
into these categories over the period 1991-1998. During the internet bubble period (1999-
2000) both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts tend to be more optimistic with near to 74% 
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(60,7%) of affiliated (unaffiliated) analysts’ strong buy and buy recommendations. On 
average, affiliated analysts are more optimistic than unaffiliated analysts. This result is 
confirmed over the 2001-2005 period. Panel B shows that the mean affiliated analyst’s 
recommendation is 2,02 whereas the mean unaffiliated analyst’s recommendation is 2,28 over 
the 1999-2000 period. The Student parametric test and Wilcoxon non parametric test reject at 
one percent level the hypothesis that the affiliated analyst’s recommendation is equal to the 
unaffiliated analyst’s recommendation. This result is confirmed over the 2001-2005 period. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
3. Results 
 
As Bradley et al. (2007) note, a common oversight in examining analyst recommendations is 
the endogenous problem between performance and analysts’ coverage. Meaning, certain time 
passes after the issuance of an IPO, its quality is revealed to public through financial 
statements and other public sources. So, other savy investors could have predicted the long 
run performance of IPOs. The analysts may just be jumping into the bandwagon when 
information is generated through some other sources such as financial statements. Our 
research model overcomes this pitfall by calculating buy and hold abnormal returns for each 
recommendation’s date. 
Table 2 shows financial analysts’ recommendations as a whole (buy; hold and sell) made 
within the three years following the IPO date. Long run performance is calculated over the 
five, three and one-year horizon. We find, over the 1991-1998 period, that market participants 
do not distinguish between recommendations made by affiliated analysts and those made by 
unafilliated analysts. Buy-and-hold returns do not reveal any statistically significant 
difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations whereas the Fama-
French model shows that investing an equal amount in portfolios covered by affiliated 
analysts give a -0,24% return per month that is statistically significant (at 5% level) compared 
to portfolios covered by unaffiliated analysts (monthly return of 0,85%, statistically 
significant at 1% level). Internet bubble period (1999-2000) presents similar findings. Buy-
and-Hold abnormal returns and Fama-French model agree about the lack of significant 
difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations. 
The opposite appears over the 2001-2005 period, when IPOs covered by affiliated analysts 
exhibit a poor underperformance compared to IPOs covered by unaffiliated analysts whatever 
the horizon we consider. For example, the five-year performance of affiliated analysts’ 
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recommendations is -45,73% whereas unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations is -62,66%. 
This difference of 16,95% is statistically significant at 1% level. This result is confirmed by 
Fama-French model. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
We have found in table 1 that financial analysts tend to be optimistic and affiliated analysts 
are more optimistic than unaffiliated analysts. On this report, we present in table 3 long run 
performance of favourable (strong buy and buy) recommendations made by affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts. We find, over the 1991-1998 period, no statistically significant 
difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations using event time 
approach whereas the calendar time approach underlines a statistically significant difference 
at 10% level in the monthly return of IPOs covered by unaffiliated analysts compared to their 
affiliated counterparts. So, investing an equal amount in IPOs’ recommendations issued by 
affiliated analysts exhibit -0,15% per month whereas IPOs’ recommendations made by 
unaffiliated analysts win 0,97% per month. Over the 1999-2000 and 2001-2005 periods, 
investor seems naive about the conflicts of interest faced by financial analysts. 
 
Insert Table 3 
An interesting question regarding these results is whether they would be different if we retain 
another definition of affiliation. Like McNichols et al. (2007), we separate our sample of IPOs 
into two mutually exclusive groups, based on analysts’ recommendations: IPOs with 
recommendations only from unaffiliated analysts and IPOs with recommendations from both 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Findings appear in Table 4. We find that IPOs’ strong buy 
and buy recommendations made by both affiliated and unafilliated analysts earn significantly 
lower returns than IPOs’ strong buy and buy recommendations made only by unaffiliated 
analysts. Over the 1991-1998 period, IPOs recommended by both affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts have a three-year performance of -23,65% that is significantly different from -
14,57% for recommendations made only by unaffiliated analysts. The Fama-French model 
specifies that monthly return of portfolios formed by IPOs recommended by both affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts is -0,33% whereas monthly return of portfolios formed by IPOs 
recommended by only unaffiliated analysts is 1,03% (difference is statistically significant at 
5% level). Over the 1999-2000 period, three-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns of IPOs 
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recommended by both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts is much severe than those 
recommended by only unaffiliated analysts. The difference is statistically significant at 1% 
level. Over the 2001-2005 period, whatever the horizon considered, IPOs recommended by 
both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts exhibit larger underperformance than those 
recommended by only unaffiliated analysts (significant at 1% level). 
These results could confirm the sceptical market hypothesis but more interestingly highlight 
the question of the interpretation of the conflicts of interest according to the definition of 
affiliation used. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
Table 5 focuses on the timing of analysts’ strong buy and buy recommendations. According to 
Adams (2003), we estimate that investor reaction is stronger to analyst recommendations 
made later in the IPO aftermarket because later recommendation is more likely to have new 
information and is not anticipated by investors. We divide strong buy and buy 
recommendations into 3 categories, those made within first year following the IPO, those 
made within second year after the IPO and those made within third year following the IPO. 
Over the 1991-1998 period, market participants do not distinguish between affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations made the first year following the offering. A 
significant difference appears only for recommendations made later in the aftermarket. 
Indeed, affiliated analysts’ recommendations made second year after the IPO date have five-
year performance of -13,93% compared to -38,99% for unaffiliated analysts’ 
recommendations (difference statistically significant at 10% level). Similar results hold for 
recommendations issue third year after the IPO with a five year performance of 3,65% for 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations compared to -30,9% for unaffiliated analysts’ 
recommendations (difference statistically significant at 1% level). 
Over the 1999-2000 period, we find no difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ 
recommendations. This could be attributable to the incentives for unaffiliated analysts to curry 
favour in this particular period and therefore they could face conflicts just as severe as 
affiliated analysts. 
Over the 2001-2005 period, affiliated analysts’ recommendations made within the first year 
following the offering exhibit a worse three-year underperformance (mean of -29,35%) than 
their unaffiliated analysts’ counterparts (mean of -19,08%).This difference is statistically 
significant at 10% level. This result could be understood by investors to be the fulfilment of 
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an implicit contract to make positive recommendation on their IPOs, and that these analysts 
will fulfil their obligation early in the IPO aftermarket. However, the opposite results are 
found for recommendations made second year after the IPO. Indeed, affiliated analysts’ 
recommendations exhibit a poor three-year underperformance of -20,86% compared to 
unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations of -32,8% (difference is statistically significant at 5% 
level). This result is reinforced for recommendations made third year after the IPO date 
whatever the horizon we consider. 
Globally, These results suggest that investors perceive affiliated analysts’ recommendations 
made later in the aftermarket as more valuable than earlier recommendations because the 
information analysts have had the additional time to provide analysis that is not anticipated by 
the market. We could suppose that conflicts of interest and pressure faced by affiliated analyst 
are influenced by the timing of recommendations. The earlier is the recommendation made in 
the IPO aftermarket the stronger is the pressure faced by affiliated analysts. 
 
Insert Table 5 
 
As in previous studies, we suppose that initiation and continuation (upgrade, downgrade or 
reiteration) convey more information than the value of recommendation itself (see for 
instance Irvine, 2003; Jegadeesh et al., 2004). Table 6 shows long run returns of analysts’ 
recommendations depending on whether they are initiation, upgrade, downgrade or 
reiteration. 
Over the 1991-1998 period, returns of initiations do not reveal any difference between 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts’ recommendations whatever the horizon. By contrast, the 
Fama-French model shows that initiation made by unaffiliated analyst exhibits monthly return 
of 0,89% compared to -0,28% for affiliated analyst. This difference is statistically significant 
at 10% level. Upgrades and Downgrades made by affiliated analysts present better five-year 
returns compared to unafilliated analysts (statistically significant at conventional levels). 
Reiterations convey no information. 
Over the 1999-2000 period, only upgrades show difference between affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts. Market discounts affiliated analysts’ upgrades compared to those made by 
unaffiliated analysts. This result could confirm the sceptical market hypothesis. We note that 
market fully incorporate the extent of the conflict of interest because we find no significantly 
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negative mean difference between three or five-year upgrades returns to the affiliated and 
those of unaffiliated analysts. 
Over the 2001-2005 period, returns of initiations present significant difference over one-year 
horizon between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Returns of affiliated analysts’ initiations 
are -7,79% compared to -20,05% for unaffiliated analysts’ initiations. The difference of 
12,25% is statistically significant at 1% level and could confirm the superior information 
hypothesis. Similar results appear for upgrades and downgrades whatever the horizon 
considered. 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
We report two multivariate regression models in table 7 to estimate the weight of favourable 
(strong buy and buy) recommendations made by affiliated analysts. Model 1 distinguishes 
IPOs’ recommendations issued by affiliated or unaffiliated analysts whereas Model 2 
distinguishes IPOs’ recommendations issued by both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts or 
unaffiliated analysts only. Thereby, models 1 and 2 are different in the definition of the 
affiliation. 
We find that favourable recommendations made by affiliated analysts are discounted by 
market participants over three and five-year horizon (confirmed by both model 1 and model 
2). This result suggests that (1) investors do not fully incorporate the perceived value of 
affiliated analysts’ recommendations and (2) the sceptical market hypothesis could be 
confirmed in European markets. However, when we distinguish favourable recommendations 
issued for a same IPO by both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts to those issued by 
unaffiliated analysts only, we find that market participants do not pay attention to potential 
conflict of interest. This result confirms the impact of the definition of affiliation used. Both 
model 1 and model 2 show that timing variable explains in a significant way (at 5% level) 60-
month performance of IPOs’ recommendations. The coefficient is negative which indicates 
that later is the recommendation made in the IPO aftermarket the weaker is the pressure faced 
by affiliated analysts. Model 2 reveals over a five-year horizon that analyst activity has an 
impact on long run performance if analyst issued a recommendation as affiliated on another 
IPO for previous one month. 
 
Insert Table 7 
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4. Conclusion 
 
The study of financial analysts’ conflicts of interest in Europe over the 1991-2005 period 
reveals that recent European legislation is very important in order to manage and avoid 
conflicts of interest. Our observation period is large and overlaps the post bubble period 
(2001-2005) characterized by these recent legislation on conflicts of interest. We find over the 
1991-1998 period that long run returns of IPOs’ recommendations highlight the possible 
pressure faced by affiliated analysts. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
applied to conflict of interest in investment research which extends the observation horizon to 
three and five years after the issuance. 
Over the 1999-2000 period, we find that European markets are naive concerning potential 
conflicts of interest. Indeed, we find no difference between returns of IPOs’ recommendations 
issued by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts whatever the horizon. This result could confirm 
our hypothesis 3 about naive market. 
Over the 2001-2005 period, recent European legislation attempt to restore investors’ 
confidence. Both regulators and media scrutinize financial analysts’ activities and this has a 
beneficial impact on long run returns of affiliated analysts’ recommendations. Timing of 
recommendations becomes very important over this recent period. Indeed, we find that the 
later is the recommendation made in the IPO aftermarket the weaker is the pressure faced by 
affiliated analysts. 
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Table 1 Difference in investment recommendations. 
Panel A Distribution of investment recommendations  
Recommendations Affiliated Analysts Unaffiliated Analysts 
 1991-1998 1999-2000 2001-2005 1991-1998 1999-2000 2001-2005 
 Freq Cum.% Freq Cum.% Freq Cum.% Freq Cum.% Freq Cum.% Freq Cum.% 
1 Strong buy 46 25,4 71 32,4 66 16,8 701 26,7 584 24,1 601 15,5 
2 Buy 40 47,5 92 74,4 132 50,4 655 51,7 889 60,7 1179 46 
3 Hold 72 87,3 42 93,6 144 87 875 85,1 711 90 1315 80 
4 Underperform 19 97,8 8 97,2 38 96,7 239 94,2 170 97 525 93,6 
5 Sell 4 100 6 100 13 100 150 100 72 100 246 100 
             
 Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Initiation 77 42,5 122 55,7 106 27 1240 47,3 1141 47 1274 33 
Upgrade 43 23,7 38 17,3 61 15,5 547 21 424 17,5 825 21,3 
Downgrade 49 27,1 39 17,9 124 31,5 667 25,4 496 20,5 1131 29,2 
Reiteration 12 6,7 20 9,1 102 26 166 6,3 365 15 636 16,5 
       
Panel B test for difference in investment recommendations 
 N Mean Median Std.Dev.   
1991-1998       
Affiliated 181 2,42 3 1,05   
Unaffiliated  2620 2,42 2 1,14   
Stat  -0,1 0,4    
1999-2000       
Affiliated 219 2,02 2 0,95   
Unaffiliated  2426 2,28 2 1   
Stat  -3,7*** -4***    
2001-2005       
Affiliated 393 2,49 2 0,99   
Unaffiliated  3866 2,65 3 1,09   
Stat  -2,7*** -2,5***    
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Table 2: Long run performance of recommendations for IPO firms over the 1991-2005 period. 
Table 2 presents long run performance for buy, hold and sell recommendations issued by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts over the 1991-2005 period. Long 
run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 36, and 60-month performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted (t) test is 
presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates significant 
difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & Book to Market-adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha(%) t-stat 
1991 to 1998 
Affiliated 181 -21,07 -3,1*** -15,02 -1,9** 1,41 0,4 -0,24 -0,4 
Unaffiliated 2620 -31,80 -9,5*** -16,98 -6,7*** 1,96 1,9** 0,85 4,3*** 
Difference  10,73 1,5 1,97 0,3 -0,54 -0,1 -1,1 -2,1**
1999 to 2000 
Affiliated 219 -61,40 -7,2*** -41,93 -7,1*** -12,09 -2,3*** -0,39 -0,4 
Unaffiliated 2426 -61,26 -23,5*** -36,69 -18,3*** -9,69 -5,2*** -0,12 -0,4 
Difference  -0,14 -0,1 -5,23 -1,3 -2,39 -0,5 -0,27 -0,3 
2001 to 2005 
Affiliated 393 -45,73 -6,2*** -20,66 -4,9*** -14,83 -4,8*** 1,23 2,5*** 
Unaffiliated 3866 -62,66 -12,5*** -31,26 -12*** -23,11 -17,6*** 0,26 1 
Difference  16,95 2,4*** 10,61 2,7*** 8,29 2,9*** 0,97 2,5*** 
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Table 3: Long run performance of favorable recommendations for IPO firms over the 1991-2005 period 
Table 3 presents long run performance for strong buy and buy recommendations issued by affiliated and unaffiliated analysts over the 1991-2005 period. Long 
run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 36, and 60-month performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted (t) test is 
presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates significant 
difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & Book to Market-adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha(%) t-stat 
1991 to 1998 
Affiliated 86 -34,6 -3,4*** -31,78 -3,4*** 0,9 0,1 -0,15 -0,3 
Unaffiliated 1356 -31,89 -6,2*** -16,08 -4,3*** 5,98 4,3*** 0,97 4,1*** 
Difference  -2,71 -0,3 -15,7 -1,6 -5,88 -1,2 -1 -1,9* 
1999 to 2000 
Affiliated 163 -62,41 -6,5*** -40,44 -6,6*** -5,43 -0,9 -0,45 -0,4 
Unaffiliated 1473 -61,57 -18,6*** -35,59 -13,4*** -3,37 -1,4 -0,16 -0,5 
Difference  -0,84 -0,1 -4,86 -1,2 -2,05 -0,3 -0,29 -0,3 
2001 to 2005 
Affiliated 198 -59,22 -6,5*** -30,72 -4,8*** -14,72 -3,7*** 0,87 1,3 
Unaffiliated 1780 -62,86 -9,8*** -28,43 -7,3*** -18,75 -9,2*** 0,13 0,5 
Difference  3,67 0,4 -2,27 -0,4 4,04 0,9 0,73 1,4 
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Table 4 : Long run performance of favorable recommendations for IPO firms over the 1991-2005 period, differentiated by both 
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts and unaffiliated analysts only. 
Table 4 presents long run performance for strong buy and buy recommendations for IPO firms issued by both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts and 
unaffiliated analysts only over the 1991-2005 period. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 36, and 60-month 
performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted (t) test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are 
statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively.
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & Book to Market-adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha(%) t-stat 
1991 to 1998 
Both aff. & unaff. 631 -34,39 -9*** -23,65 -6,7*** 5,35 2,9*** -0,33 -0,6 
Unaffiliated only 808 -30,07 -4,3*** -11,57 -2,2** 6 3,2*** 1,03 3,3*** 
Difference  -4,32 -0,6 -12,09 -2,2** -0,65 -0,2 -1,25 -2,1**
1999 to 2000 
Both aff. & unaff. 810 -64,19 -14*** -40,06 -10*** -5,90 -2,3** 0,24 0,2 
Unaffiliated only 807 -59,29 -13,2*** -31,99 -9,4*** -1,27 -0,4 1,15 2,2** 
Difference  -4,91 -1,3 -8,07 -2,6*** -4,63 -1,1 -0,90 -0,6 
2001 to 2005 
Both aff. & unaff. 1068 -70,92 -7,2*** -33,63 -5*** -21,04 -11,9*** 0,98 1,8* 
Unaffiliated only 894 -53,66 -7,7*** -22,20 -5,3*** -15,04 -5,2*** 0,21 0,5 
Difference  -17,26 -3*** -11,43 -2,7*** -6 -2,7*** 0,77 1,7* 
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Table 5: Long run performance of IPO firms based on timing of recommendations. 
Table 5 presents long run performance for strong buy and buy recommendations for IPO firms by distinguishing timing of recommendations over the 1991-
1998 period. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 36, 60-month performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted 
(t) test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates significant 
difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively.
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & Book to Market-adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha(%) t-stat 
Recommendation issued first year after the IPO date 
Affiliated 105 -31,43 -3,3*** -15,80 -1,4 3,86 0,9 0,33 0,6 
Unaffiliated 1043 -26,49 -4,4*** -14,89 -4,2*** 7,07 5,3*** 0,71 2,7*** 
Difference  -4,94 -0,5 -0,91 -0,1 -3,21 -0,6 -0,29 -0,5 
Recommendation issued second year after the IPO date 
Affiliated 45 -13,93 -1,1 -22,17 -1,8* 0,4 0,1 0,31 0,4 
Unaffiliated 862 -38,99 -8,5*** -36,25 -9,5*** -5,48 -3,1*** 1,26 3,9*** 
Difference  25,05 1,9* 14,08 1,1 5,90 0,8 -0,73 -1,1 
Recommendation issued third year after the IPO date 
Affiliated 31 3,65 0,3 -1,97 -0,1 -5,42 -0,5 1,60 1,4 
Unaffiliated 715 -30,90 -7,8*** 3,19 0,6 3,48 1,7* 1,69 5,2*** 
Difference  34,55 2,8*** -5,16 -0,4 -8,90 -1,2 0,58 0,5 
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Table 5(continued): Long run performance of IPO firms based on timing of recommendations. 
Table 5 (continued) presents long run performance for strong buy and buy recommendations for IPO firms by distinguishing timing of recommendations over 
the 1999-2000 period. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 36, 60-month performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-
Adjusted (t) test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates 
significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively.
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & Book to Market-adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha(%) t-stat 
Recommendation issued first year after the IPO date 
Affiliated 127 -59,68 -6*** -41,18 -6,4*** -6,58 -0,8 -0,61 -0,6 
Unaffiliated 792 -56,73 -12,8*** -34,56 -10,5*** -5,78 -1,8* -0,62 -1,3 
Difference  -2,94 -0,5 -6,62 -1,4 -0,79 -0,1 0,01 0,1 
Recommendation issued second year after the IPO date 
Affiliated 68 -55,13 -3,4*** -34,30 -3*** -19,93 -2,3** -0,47 -0,4 
Unaffiliated 933 -60,16 -15,3*** -35,60 -10,7*** -12,78 -4*** -0,33 -0,9 
Difference  5,03 0,6 1,30 0,2 -7,15 -1 -0,14 -0,1 
Recommendation issued third year after the IPO date 
Affiliated 24 -88,28 -1,4 -67,48 -1,9** -19 -1,2 -1,79 -1 
Unaffiliated 701 -67,83 -13,4*** -40,57 -10,1 -10 -3*** -0,03 -0,1 
Difference  -20,45 -1,4 -26,91 -1,7* -9 -0,6 -1,76 -1,1 
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Table 5(continued): Long run performance of IPO firms based on timing of recommendations. 
Table 5 (continued) presents long run performance for strong buy and buy recommendations for IPO firms by distinguishing timing of recommendations over 
the 2001-2005 period. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 36, and 60-month performances. Bootstrapped 
Skewness-Adjusted (t) test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are statistically significant. *; ** and *** 
indicates significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively.
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & Book to Market-adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha(%) t-stat 
Recommendation issued first year after the IPO date 
Affiliated 115 -48,11 -5,6*** -29,35 -5,1*** -10,59 -3*** 1,13 2,1** 
Unaffiliated 713 -47,68 -11,6*** -19,08 -6,3*** -14,20 -9,5*** 0,30 0,8 
Difference  -0,43 -0,1 -10,26 -1,8* 3,60 1 0,84 1,6 
Recommendation issued second year after the IPO date 
Affiliated 133 -40,66 -3*** -20,86 -3,9*** -22,36 -3,7*** 0,79 1,1 
Unaffiliated 1326 -55,87 -5,9*** -32,80 -10,7*** -28,80 -20,3*** 0,24 0,8 
Difference  15,21 1,3 11,94 2,2** 6,44 1,3 0,55 0,8 
Recommendation issued third year after the IPO date 
Affiliated 145 -48,68 -3,7*** -13,70 -1,6 -11,28 -2** 1,5 2,1** 
Unaffiliated 1827 -73,87 -9,8*** -34,86 -8,3*** -22,47 -10,3*** 0,24 0,9 
Difference  25,19 1,8* 21,16 2,5*** 11,19 2** 1,27 2** 
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Table 6: Long run performance of initiation and continuation recommendations for IPO firms. 
Table 6 presents long run performance for initiation and continuation (upgrade, downgrade and reiteration) recommendations issued by affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts over the 1991-1998 period. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 36, and 60-month 
performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted (t) test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are 
statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively.
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & Book to Market-adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha(%) t-stat 
Initiation 
Affiliated 77 -49,93 -4,2*** -25,99 -1,5 -2,19 -0,4 -0,28 -0,5 
Unaffiliated 1240 -34,20 -6,7*** -21,89 -6,5*** 3,23 2,3*** 0,89 3,8*** 
Difference  -15,73 -1,5 -4,1 -0,3 -5,43 -1,1 -1,18 -1,8* 
Upgrade 
Affiliated 43 -2,17 -0,2 -8,81 -0,8 3,44 0,5 0,56 0,7 
Unaffiliated 547 -27,15 -4,7*** -6,34 -1 7,08 3,2*** 1,26 4*** 
Difference  24,98 1,9** -2,47 -0,2 -3,64 -0,5 -0,54 -0,8 
Downgrade 
Affiliated 49 0,29 0,1 -2,10 -0,2 1,10 0,1 0,94 1,5 
Unaffiliated 667 -31,44 -4,5*** -16,92 -3,2*** -3,40 -1,7* 0,74 2,6*** 
Difference  31,73 2,5*** 14,82 1,2 4,50 0,6 0,20 0,3 
Reiteration 
Affiliated 12 9,10 0,3 -19,60 -0,7 18,59 1,2 1,40 1,6 
Unaffiliated 166 -30,73 -2,6*** -15,65 -1,2 -2,88 -0,7 1,13 2,8*** 
Difference  39,84 1,2 -3,96 -0,1 21,47 1,4 0,38 0,5 
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Table 6 (continued): Long run performance of initiation and continuation recommendations for IPO firms. 
Table 6 (continued) presents long run performance for initiation and continuation (upgrade, downgrade and reiteration) recommendations issued by affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts over the 1999-2000 period. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 36, and 60-month 
performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted (t) test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are 
statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively.
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & Book to Market-adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha(%) t-stat 
Initiation 
Affiliated 122 -57,18 -5,2*** -37,61 -4,8*** -5,19 -0,7 -0,59 -0,7 
Unaffiliated 1141 -60,83 -16,4*** -36,92 -13,7*** -8,02 -2,9*** -0,30 -0,9 
Difference  3,65 0,6 -0,69 -0,2 2,83 0,4 -0,29 -0,3 
Upgrade 
Affiliated 38 -63,61 -2,4*** -42 -2,3** -16,56 -1,8* -1,06 -0,5 
Unaffiliated 424 -60,18 -9,4*** -34,37 -6,7*** 1,08 0,2 -0,33 -0,8 
Difference  -3,43 -0,3 -7,63 -0,8 -17,64 -1,9** -0,73 -0,4 
Downgrade 
Affiliated 39 -70,67 -3,1*** -52,72 -2,3** -23,06 -1,7* -0,53 -0,4 
Unaffiliated 496 -62,31 -10,7*** -39,46 -9,7*** -22,08 -5,4*** -0,41 -1,2 
Difference  -8,36 -0,8 -13,26 -1,3 -0,98 -0,1 -0,12 -0,1 
Reiteration 
Affiliated 20 -64,83 -3,5*** -47,05 -3,5*** -24,23 -1,6 -0,01 -0,1 
Unaffiliated 365 -62,39 -9,3*** -34,93 -5,9*** -10,60 -2,6*** -0,01 -0,1 
Difference  -2,43 -0,2 -12,11 -0,9 -13,64 -1 0 0,1 
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Table 6 (continued): Long run performance of initiation and continuation recommendations for IPO firms. 
Table 6 (continued) presents long run performance for initiation and continuation (upgrade, downgrade and reiteration) recommendations issued by affiliated 
and unaffiliated analysts over the 2001-2005 period. Long run performance is computed as Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns over 12, 36, and 60-month 
performances. Bootstrapped Skewness-Adjusted (t) test is presented to estimate whether the BHAR or the difference between sample distribution are 
statistically significant. *; ** and *** indicates significant difference at 10%; 5% and 1% level respectively.
Type of abnormal return 
 N Size & Book to Market-adjusted  Fama-French 
  BHAR60 (%) t-stat BHAR36 (%) t-stat BHAR12 (%) t-stat Alpha(%) t-stat 
Initiation 
Affiliated 106 -47,43 -4,1*** -27,41 -4,3*** -7,79 -1,4 0,65 1,2 
Unaffiliated 1274 -57,63 -10,6*** -28,05 -7,5*** -20,05 -8,7*** 0,35 1,3 
Difference  10,20 1,2 0,64 0,1 12,25 2,5*** 0,30 0,6 
Upgrade 
Affiliated 61 -20,79 -1,1 -9,86 -1 -0,4 -0,1 1,25 1,9** 
Unaffiliated 825 -63,15 -5*** -27,62 -4,3*** -18,5 -6,7*** 0,21 0,7 
Difference  42,36 2,2** 17,75 1,8* 18,09 2,5*** 1,04 1,7* 
Downgrade 
Affiliated 124 -46,01 -3,1*** -24,94 -3,4*** -26,07 -5,2*** 1,06 1,9** 
Unaffiliated 1131 -70,85 -5,7*** -39,92 -11,7*** -30,81 -17,3*** 0,31 1,1 
Difference  24,84 1,9* 14,98 2,2** 4,73 1,1 0,75 1,6 
Reiteration 
Affiliated 102 -58,22 -4,2*** -14,90 -1,5 -17,09 -2,4*** 0,73 0,6 
Unaffiliated 636 -57,32 -5,9*** -27,05 -6,3*** -21,58 -6,9*** 0,15 0,5 
Difference  -0,9 -0,1 12,14 1,3 4,48 0,6 0,58 0,5 
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Table 7:Cross-sectional regressions of long run performance of IPOs over the 1991-2005 period. 
The dependant variable is Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return. Panel A (B and C) focuses over a five (three and one) -year horizon respectively.* (and 
respectively, **, ***) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from 0 at a 10% (and respectively, 5%, 1%) level using Student t-statistics. We use 
cluster OLS regression model. This specifies that the observations are independent across groups but not necessarily independent within groups. 
      
 BHAR 60 BHAR 36 BHAR 12 
 9325 observations (508 IPOs) 9690 observations (524 IPOs) 9705 observations (525 IPOs) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
   
Intercept 0,007 -0,002 0,007 0,040 0,014 0,010 
Previous analyst activity 0,100 0,150** -0,012 0,028 0,003 0,013 
Affiliation 0,127 -0,115 0,130* -0,060 0,016 0,016 
Favorable -0,102*** -0,003 -0,097*** -0,104 0,024 0,019 
Timing -0,080** -0,091** -0,016 -0,022 -0,025 -0,025 
Dispersion -0,814*** -0,811*** -0,471*** -0,466*** -0,052 -0,049 
Coverage -0,043 -0,021 0,021 0,041 0,034 0,025 
Tech firm -0,418*** -0,416*** -0,369*** -0,367*** -0,164*** -0,165*** 
Syndicate 0,105 0,125 0,080 0,089 -0,021 -0,025 
Underpricing 0,181* 0,185* 0,109 0,105 -0,035 -0,039 
VC affiliation -0,090 -0,072 0,048 0,060 0,023 0,020 
1991-1998 -- -- -- -- 0,035 0,035 
1999-2000 -0,157 -0,170 -0,106 -0,113 -- -- 
2001-2005 -0,204 -0,197 -0,065 -0,061 -0,127*** -0,128*** 
France -0,163 -0,096 -0,138 -0,136 0,094* 0,093* 
Germany 0,095 0,169 -- -- -- -- 
England -- -- -0,064 -0,108 0,114** 0,128** 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
  
Definition of regression variables : 
  
Previous analyst activity Dummy variable equals 1 if financial analyst issued a recommendation on another IPO for previous one month 
as affiliated and 0 otherwise. 
Affiliation Dummy variable equals 1 if financial analyst is affiliated (Model 1). 
Dummy variable equals 1 if IPO was covered by both affiliated and unaffiliated analysts and 0 if IPO was 
covered by unaffiliated analyst only (Model 2).  
Favorable We test the interaction between the characteristics of analysts (whether or not analysts are affiliated) and the 
nature of recommendations. This variable is 2 for ‘strong buy’ recommendations, 1 for ‘buy’, and 0 for ‘hold’, 
‘underperform’ and ‘sell’ issued by affiliated analyst. 
Timing Trading days from IPO date to recommendation. It takes the value of 1 (2 and 3) for recommendation made 
within the first (second and third) year after the offering. 
Dispersion It represents the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of analysts’ recommendations within one, three and 
five-year following IPO 
Coverage Dummy variable equals 1 if the number of coverage is above the median level and 0 otherwise. 
Tech firm Dummy variable equals 1 if IPO firms are technology firms, 0 otherwise. 
Syndicate Dummy variable equals 1 if the number of managing underwriters is above the median level and 0 otherwise. 
Underpricing Dummy variable equals 1 if IPOs have initial return above the median level and 0 otherwise. 
VC affiliation Dummy variable equals 1 if venture capitalists are affiliated to IPOs at the time of the offering and 0 otherwise. 
1991-1998 Dummy variable equals 1 if recommendation is issued during the 1991-1998 period. 
1999-2000 Dummy variable equals 1 if recommendation is issued during the 1999-2000 period. 
2001-2005 Dummy variable equals 1 if recommendation is issued during the 2001-2005 period. 
France Dummy variable equals 1 if recommendation is issued on IPO that went public on French market.
Germany Dummy variable equals 1 if recommendation is issued on IPO that went public on Deutsch market. 
England Dummy variable equals 1 if recommendation is issued on IPO that went public on English market. 
 
